A Non-Believer's Argument for Belief

Although I thought it would be funny to just have a blank entry published here, which might in a sense be more appropriate given the title, I wanted to jot down an idea that has occurred to me recently while doing some reading . . .

I understand that in many ways it has gone out of fashion, especially among philosophers, to argue for the existence of god (and I will keep it in lower caps because I am not writing about any particular god -- I just mean some god at some point and time be that god a monotheistic, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent god, or some random lightning bolt throwing god hanging out with a whole group of other gods although I may be prejudicially explaining a possible argument for the ONE GOD) . . . anyhow I have been thinking that there may be a pretty solid argument for at least putting belief in god as being as rationally valid as belief in the world as we "experience" it . . . warning, warning -- this may all be nothing more than Descartes' god of the thinking ones, but I have a hunch that it is something a little bit different . . . and perhaps more honest . . .

Let us take for a second the brain in a vat hooked up to a supercomputer notion of existence (it goes by a million different names and/or scenarios but I reckon you know what I mean when I, like the Buddha, say, "How can I know this is not a dream?") as not so much possible but as a pretty solid wrench in most epistemological systems.

I should warn you global skepticism keeps me up at night . . . well not really, but it probably should . . . whenever I get too worried about such things I just kick something really hard.

The sincere thinker may have to admit at some point that we really can't be sure that this whole-she-bang is REAL and that eventually we take a leap of faith in creating systems of knowledge/reality (even coherence theory is based on the notion that somehow things should fit together -- why?!).  Well, if existence as thought of in the traditional sense (by traditional I mean the everyday commonsensical notion that we are in fact physical-conscious entities existing in a world with physical and temporal properties) can be brought into question then the idea that god exists may be as valid as accepting reality . . . let me phrase it this way: if you buy into the argument of global skepticism, or if you simply ignore the global skeptics altogether rather than refuting them through the use of reason, then you may be just as reasonable in buying into the notion that god exists either somewhere within or outside of the vat . . . Here is what I am suggesting: since attempts to logically arrive at the existence of god always seem to get muddled somewhere along the line, god's existence typically comes down to a "leap of faith" and this leap of faith mirrors our standard leap of faith out of global skepticism and into the workaday world we actually live in.

Most people don't really believe they are trapped in the Matrix, but it's downright difficult to prove you don't live in the Matrix and in that sense might one "irrationally-rationally" take a leap of faith beyond the universe and toward god without being any more off his/her rocker than the rest of us simply content to pretend we know we don't live in the Matrix?  And I'm not saying god is somehow running the supercomputer, I am simply saying that we may be more than brains in a vat, or we may be brains in a vat, and that somewhere out there or in here believing in god may be as valid as believing in "traditional" existence . . .

Global skepticism puts a wrench in knowing the world exists.
I still choose to accept the world as existing in the "traditional" sense.
I consider this leap of faith rational, because it allows me to function. (of course this might be a mistake)
Therefore I am at least sometimes rational in taking leaps of faith.
I take a leap of faith in believing god exists because it gives life meaning.
Am I at least as rational in taking this leap of faith as the earlier leap of faith taken in believing that the world exists?

Probably.